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Questions for Bud
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Robert Harris
2017-08-08 16:29:18 UTC
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How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?

Did they base it on almost half of the witnesses saying they
heard a shot from the Knoll?

Did they base it on most of the witnesses stating that the
final shots were very close together, some saying almost
"simultaneous"?

Did they base it on the DPD's conclusion, just hours earlier,
that Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy?

Did they base it on Hoover's belief that Connally came
between a sniper and JFK, as he reported to LBJ?

Has it ever occurred to you that they had about as much
evidence as you do, to support the lone nut theory, and that
you have NONE :-)





Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-09 02:34:49 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation. How long do you think it
took them to figure out that Hinckley had no accomplices? Sara Jane Moore?
Squeaky Fromme?

A better question might not be how they figured it out so quickly, but
how some people can`t figure it out at all.
Post by Robert Harris
Did they base it on almost half of the witnesses saying they
heard a shot from the Knoll?
No, they were smarter than that. This is the kind of thing conspiracy
hobbyist find significant, when it is easy to determine why it is
insignificant.
Post by Robert Harris
Did they base it on most of the witnesses stating that the
final shots were very close together, some saying almost
"simultaneous"?
This is perception, this isn`t data.
Post by Robert Harris
Did they base it on the DPD's conclusion, just hours earlier,
that Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy?
Actually it was to head off that kind of baseless speculation.
Post by Robert Harris
Did they base it on Hoover's belief that Connally came
between a sniper and JFK, as he reported to LBJ?
Hoover seems to have a poor understanding of the mechanics of this event.
Why would you focus on this, what do you think it tells you?
Post by Robert Harris
Has it ever occurred to you that they had about as much
evidence as you do, to support the lone nut theory, and that
you have NONE :-)
I have plenty of information to determine what occurred. So do you, you
just lack the capability.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Robert Harris
2017-08-09 16:43:18 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.

Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.

Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?

Please be specific.


Robert Harris
John McAdams
2017-08-09 16:51:15 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why don't you present evidence that anybody else was involved?

And your arcane 285 theory doesn't count, because nobody when
Katzenbach was writing had heard about it. And if they were alive to
hear about it today, they would not believe it.

The simple fact is that Katzenbach believed Oswald did it along, along
with pretty much every other government official.

Wade, on Friday night, said "there was no one else."

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1140&relPageId=769

You can say they were wrong, but it's not a "coverup" is you are
convinced that Oswald was the lone assassin.

.John
-----------------------
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-10 02:28:27 UTC
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Post by John McAdams
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why don't you present evidence that anybody else was involved?
And your arcane 285 theory doesn't count, because nobody when
Katzenbach was writing had heard about it. And if they were alive to
hear about it today, they would not believe it.
The simple fact is that Katzenbach believed Oswald did it along, along
with pretty much every other government official.
Wade, on Friday night, said "there was no one else."
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=1140&relPageId=769
You can say they were wrong, but it's not a "coverup" is you are
convinced that Oswald was the lone assassin.
Silly, do you have a point? No.
It could be a lone shooter and also a conspiracy.
That's what the DPD, LBJ, CIA and FBI thought.
That Oswald was the lone shooter working for Castro.
A contract hit man.
Just stop the cover-up.
Post by John McAdams
.John
-----------------------
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/home.htm
Jason Burke
2017-08-10 02:26:10 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
  Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Nice comma.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-10 02:31:09 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...

https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html

"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."

"begun writing it..."

But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-10 22:00:41 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
It was only written when they knew there would be no trial, but there
were lots of rumors which could start WWIII.
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-11 13:49:02 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than the HSCA? Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than BBN? Please be specific.
Why do you refuse to answer questions. Please be specific.
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-12 15:01:42 UTC
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Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than the HSCA?
I`m not, they got mostly everything right. Oswald took three shots at
the limo, and all the wounds on the limo victims are attributable to those
three shots.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than BBN?
The Bible Broadcast Network? They seem to believe the dinosaurs became
extinct when Noah`s great flood occurred. That would mean that man and
dinosaurs would need to exist at the same time. These people watch the
Flintstones and think they are watching a documentary. Yes, I am smarter
than them.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Why do you refuse to answer questions.
Try putting question marks at the end of them.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
bigdog
2017-08-13 13:26:29 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than the HSCA?
I`m not, they got mostly everything right. Oswald took three shots at
the limo, and all the wounds on the limo victims are attributable to those
three shots.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Why do you think you're smarter than BBN?
The Bible Broadcast Network? They seem to believe the dinosaurs became
extinct when Noah`s great flood occurred. That would mean that man and
dinosaurs would need to exist at the same time. These people watch the
Flintstones and think they are watching a documentary. Yes, I am smarter
than them.
A shame there wasn't room on the boat for a couple brontosauruses. I think
it was Noah's son who went to him and said, "We're going to need a bigger
boat".
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Why do you refuse to answer questions.
Try putting question marks at the end of them.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Please be specific.
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-11 16:53:45 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-12 15:02:38 UTC
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Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-13 13:25:37 UTC
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Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED. Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-14 02:34:10 UTC
Reply
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Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-14 19:41:28 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Issued means it was typed up and sent. It had to be written up as a
draft first. The moment Oswald was dead.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
We just quoted him saying that.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-15 02:40:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Issued means it was typed up and sent.
How does the word apply to Harris`s claim that the whole letter was
written about 24 hours after the assassination?
Post by Anthony Marsh
It had to be written up as a
draft first. The moment Oswald was dead.
Support that.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
We just quoted him saying that.
Where?
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-15 21:52:06 UTC
Reply
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Raw Message
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Issued means it was typed up and sent.
How does the word apply to Harris`s claim that the whole letter was
written about 24 hours after the assassination?
Written as in a draft. Then edited and typed up and sent later.

On November 25 1963, the day of the Kennedy funeral, Assistant Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach sent a memo to Bill Moyers of the new Johnson
White House. He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after
Oswald's death at the hands of Jack Ruby.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
It had to be written up as a
draft first. The moment Oswald was dead.
Support that.
That is what Latzenbach said. In his HSCA testimony.

http://history-matters.com/archive/jfk/hsca/reportvols/vol3/pdf/HSCA_Vol3_0921_5_Katzen.pdf
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
We just quoted him saying that.
Where?
Get a better newsreader.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-15 21:52:40 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Issued means it was typed up and sent.
How does the word apply to Harris`s claim that the whole letter was
written about 24 hours after the assassination?
Post by Anthony Marsh
It had to be written up as a
draft first. The moment Oswald was dead.
Support that.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
We just quoted him saying that.
Where?
TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Katzenbach, it is good to have you with us today. I
ask that you stand and be sworn in at this time. Do you solemnly swear
the evidence you are about to give before this committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do.
Mr. PREYER. We have a rather slim attendance at this moment because
of a vote that is on on the House floor. I think Members will be
returning momentarily.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Not a new experience for me.






643

Mr. PREYER. I suggest that we take a several minute recess in
place, if you do not mind. We would like to have--here is Mr. McKinney
here right now. I think we are ready to proceed.
The committee will recognize Gary Cornwell, counsel for the
committee, to begin the questioning of the witness.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared at this time to question
the witness. However, I had the opportunity to take a lengthy deposition
from Mr. Katzenbach previously. That deposition has been provided to the
committee and I have been informed that the committee has had an
opportunity to study it carefully.
In light of that, I might suggest, in view of the late hour,
perhaps the committee might simply like to begin first and ask the
questions of Mr. Katzenbach in those areas that we are most concerned with.
Mr. PREYER. Is the deposition a part of the record or do you wish
it introduced into evidence at this point in the record?
Mr. CORNWELL. It is in the files. Mr. Katzenbach has not yet had an
opportunity to read it carefully himself and to sign it. As soon as he
does so, it will be made a permanent part of the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Fine. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKinney to begin the
questioning of the witness.
Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Attorney General, it is a pleasure to see you
again. We really appreciate your coming to help us in these
deliberations.
I would like to start out by asking the question as to your
exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the
FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people. This
is somewhat evidenced by your memorandum to Mr. Moyers of November 25.
What was your basic motivation in looking for such speed?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think my basic motivation was the amount of
speculation both here and abroad as to what was going on, whether there
was a conspiracy of the right or a conspiracy of the left or a lone
assassin or even in its wildest stages, a conspiracy by the then Vice
President to achieve the Presidency, the sort of thing you have
speculation about in some countries abroad where that kind of condition
is normal.
It seemed to me that the quicker some information could be made
available that went beyond what the press was able to uncover and what
the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state of
affairs.
Mr. McKINNEY. In your deposition to the committee on page 8, you
suggested that one of your interests was that the facts, all of them,
had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the
public, both in this country and abroad, the confidence that no facts
were being withheld at all.
Do you think that pushing for this type of speed might have hurt
the accuracy of the report or brought about the fact that some people
would question the speed of its issuance its thoroughness its
completeness?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not think the two notions are connected,
Congressman. I think the motivations for getting some kind of report
out, some facts out early were the ones that I have stated.







644

The memorandum of Mr. Moyers and a number of other conversations and
things that I have said really related to the desirability of a totally
thorough, complete investigation by a commission, such as the Warren
Commission, which should point out all of the facts available and all of
the reasons for their conclusions.
I never intended at any point that the investigation done by the
FBI would be a substitute for the kind of investigation of President
Kennedy's assassination.
Mr. McKINNEY. Perhaps for the general public and for the committee,
you could discuss for us your recollection of when and how the idea of a
Presidential Commission came forth. I know you mention it in your
memorandum to Mr. Moyers again.
How did you feel about it, at first? Were you opposed to it or not,
and when it was finally firmed up, how was it finally decided?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think an idea like that perhaps has several
apparents. It was something that very soon after the assassination I
thought was a good idea, that such a Commission should be formed of
people of impeccable integrity, people who would search for the truth
and who would make that truth public because I did not believe that if
it remained entirely within the executive branch that that effect could
ever be achieved as far as the general public here or abroad was concerned.
So, I thought very early that such a Commission was essential to,
really to the political process, to getting all of the facts out on such
an occasion as the assassination of a popular and respected President.
So, I pressed for that very early. I was never opposed to it. I
was, however, in a somewhat awkward position because of my
responsibilities in the Department of Justice as Deputy Attorney General
at that time and, in effect, very nearly acting Attorney General at that
time because of Robert Kennedy's tragic loss and reaction that he had to
the assassination of his brother.
My awkwardness was because it was perfectly obvious to anybody who
knew anything about the Federal Bureau of Investigation that they were
certain to resent the appointment of any such commission. 80, on the one
hand, and if I were thought to be the source of that or to recommend
that, then it would very seriously affect my relations with Mr. Hoover
and the Bureau.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, it is safe to say that with the mere
mention of another investigation or another investigation or an
investigative commission, Mr. Hoover would have considered it a somewhat
of an insult to the FBI in its activities in this area.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Absolutely.
Mr. McKINNEY. You brought up the subject of the Attorney General,
so I will move to that for just a moment. I think it also might be of
benefit to the committee and the public if you were to describe to us as
best you could the Attorney General's role and his feelings at that
time. It has been difficult, I think, even though everyone is aware of
the tremendous loss, for many people to understand why the Attorney
General., who had had task forces all over the United States looking
into organized crime, who had been an active prosecutor of organized
crime, who had been an extremely activist Attorney General, why he never
took more of a role in ordering the FBI to do things and in ordering his
in-the-field people






645

who had connections with the Mafia to move into any areas such as the
Cuban area.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, when the assassination occurred, Robert
Kennedy's world just came apart, in that not only his affection for his
brother, but everything that they had been trying to do, everything they
had worked for a long time just went with that shot.
He was very devastated both I think by the personal loss and by the
sudden crashing halt of all of the things that he had worked for with
his brother for a long period of time.
His attitude was not difficult, I think, for those who knew him
well to understand. He said nothing that was done was going to bring his
brother back to life and it was, I think, almost as simple as that, as
far as he was concerned.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, not only was his devastation personal
but it was political in that it was just over, the whole dream.
Mr. KATZENBACH, I think it was both. Both the two were so
intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish them, I think. I think I
would put them both under the feeling of personal. Everything that you
were doing in life, a brother who was beloved just suddenly turned to
dust.
Mr. McKINNEY. Throughout your deposition, you bring up a point that
I do not think as a committee member I was aware of. Even in discussing
the formation of a commission on page 13 of your deposition, you said,
"I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility abroad
than any other American."
And you go on throughout your deposition in describing a tremendous
amount of pressure from the State Department. I wonder if you would like
to go into that in any more depth for the committee as to exactly why
that pressure and in what forms it took. We have several exhibits
suggesting the international repercussions, which I will put in the
record later, which are essentially memos from Belmont, Jenkins, and
Donahou and others.
I thought perhaps you might like to go into the background of
that.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I was certainly communicated with several
times by the State Department and I suppose in a sense that is
pressure, although I do not know that I really felt it as pressure. I
felt they had their problems and they wanted some help in trying
to resolve them.
We have 120, or whatever it is, Embassies around the world and
every Ambassador there was being asked about this, being asked
by that government what was happening, what was the story on it,
as well as what effect it would have on our foreign policy, and 1
think they were very--being no information really available to
them, they were simply feeling the lack of it and feeling that
affected their credibility in foreign governments.
Mr. McKINNEY. Were they suggesting or did you have any con-
versations with the White House that suggested that perhaps
President Johnson's viability as a world leader was in question or
weakened until the whole issue of who shot President Kennedy was
resolved to the world's satisfaction?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not now recall any conversations as specif-
ic as that. It seems to me that had to be an underlying factor and,







646

in addition, perhaps it is important to remember that President Kennedy
had worked a long time and had achieved a considerable amount of stature
after some fairly difficult beginnings.
That here was not a totally unknown President, not totally unknown,
relatively certainly unknown person in the Presidency.
Mr. MCKINNEY. As essentially, although certainly not officially,
acting Attorney General during this period would you describe to the
committee what your relationship was with Mr. Hoover at that time?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I had never had a great deal of relationship with
Mr. Hoover in terms of personal relationship with him. I suppose I had
seen him a half dozen times maybe while I was in the Department of
Justice. He had a considerable animosity, I think, toward Robert Kennedy.
I think he had never been in a position of having an Attorney
General who was closer to the President than he was and that was a new
situation for him, and one I do not think he liked. His relationship
with Mr. Kennedy was very, I think, cold formal and I suppose as Robert
Kennedy's deputy, some of that shed off on me.
Mr. McKINNEY. Wasn't it true or isn't it inferable that Bobby
Kennedy's very drive against organized crime was, in effect, a slap in
the face to Mr. Hoover in that it implied that the FBI had not been the
gangbusters that we were all brought up to think they were?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I think that is true and, of course, the drive
in civil rights was one that kept exposing the Bureau to criticism,
right or wrong, and that was resented by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover resented
criticism to a degree greater than any other person that I have ever known.
Mr. McKINNEY. I do not know whether you were in the room earlier,
but I mentioned and brought up to Mr. Rankin a letter to Mr. Tolson in
which the FBI, in essence, refused to go to the Warren Commission
meeting as liaison and in essence refused to brief you as to what they
were doing, stating that they would have nothing further to say to
either the Commission or anyone else until their investigation was finished.
This was somewhat a slap to you as well as to the Warren
Commission. How did you react to this?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think, Congressman, the first thing to remember
is that was a letter from Allen Belmont to Tolson, not a piece of paper
that I saw at the time or the Chief Justice saw at the time or that
anybody other than those within the Bureau.
I think it is also important to remember that no memorandum, no
letter written in the Bureau was really written for anyone other than
Mr. Hoover. That is, it would reflect whatever the author thought Mr.
Hoover's views were. I do not believe that Al Belmont put to me or had
me put to the Chief Justice any flat refusal of that kind to go as a
liaison.
My recollection is that the Bureau's attitude at that time was that
it would be better if we did not go to this organizational meeting of
the Commission because we will be asked a lot of questions about a
report that is not complete, which we do not wish to answer until the
report is complete; not an unreasonable posi-






647

tion to take and not one which reflects the attitudes reflected in the
memorandum which you are reading.
And I believe that 1 probably, although I have no specific
recollection of it, conveyed to the Chief Justice that view and those
reasons and that he accepted them.
Mr. McKINNEY. How did you feel as the Warren Commission moved on in
its work? How did you feel about the FBI's thoroughness and the FBI's
cooperation with the Commission?
Mr. KATZENBACH. It was always my view, the whole time that I was in
the Department of Justice, that the Bureau would do what you asked the
Bureau to do and that they would do it well and professionally. They did
not like what they were doing. They might want something more specific
in the way of instructions than if they liked what they were doing.
For example, if you were to look at the files now on civil rights
matters and compared them with ordinary crimes that the Bureau was
investigating, you would find very detailed memorandum to the FBI from
John Door in the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall saying please do
this and then answers to that or this, do something else, three and four
page instructions.
Whereas if it was a kidnapping, you did not really have to give
them any instructions. They were there and doing things as they ought to
be done.
I regarded then and I regard now, despite all that has come out,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation is probably the most highly trained,
the most effective investigative agency in the world.
Mr. MCKINNEY. How do you tie that though to the fact that we now
know they actually withheld from the Warren Commission any information
they had regarding the CIA's overtures to the Mafia and the
assassination attempts against Castro?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I am very surprised that they did that and I really
have no explanation as to why they did that. It may have been because
Mr. Dulles was a member of the Commission and they thought that was his
job to do it, but I am quite surprised, given relationships between the
FBI and the CIA, I am surprised that the FBI did not seize the
opportunity to embarrass the CIA.
Mr. MCKINNEY. I am glad you used that word "embarrass" the CIA
because I was going to ask you if you would describe your understanding
at this period. My understanding is that the Director of the FBI had
removed liaison from the CIA and the CIA retaliated. We had a situation
where neither agency was talking to the other, basically on the basis of
personal animosity rather than anything factual.
Is this your understanding of their relationship at this time?
Mr. KATZENBACH. There may be some overstatement in that.
Essentially that was strained for that reason. On the other hand,
whenever that occurred and it occurred on other occasions, liaison was
maintained simply because it had to be maintained at a lower level.
Mr. McKINNEY. You state in your deposition--we will move on to the
CIA, on page 19. You say and I quote:
Perhaps naively, but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles
to the Commission would insure that the Commission had access to
anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles
did not at least make that






648

information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been
skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be
further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of
secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978.

And then you went on to say that you are referring to generally
anything that the CIA had in its files. Are you somewhat appalled at
this point when you find out that not only were the files not thoroughly
given to the Warren Commission but that such impor-
tant things as Nosenko were not really given very happily?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I am.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think that there is anything that this
committee could possibly propose, should this terrible type of horror
happen again, that would give a Commission such as the Warren Commission
any type of authority which would override the bureaucratic malaise that
we seemed to have had back during the Warren Commission days?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I really cannot think of anything offhand. In the
final analysis in government, you have to rely on the integrity and the
competence of people in high position. They may not always have the
integrity they should have and they may not always have that competence,
but if you do not have that, it is pretty hard to scotch tape a solution
around.
Mr. MCKINNEY. There are two letters, as you probably know, which
are Kennedy exhibits F-466 and F-473 from Mr. DeLoach, one of them on
11-25 and one on 12-20 concerning the leaks of the FBI information and a
report, in essence, in one accusing you of leaking information. In your
deposition you indicated it would be difficult for you to do so because
you did not know the information.
And I just wondered what you could give this committee that would
enlighten us at to why the FBI instead of simply putting out their
report with the facts as they saw them started this process of slowly
leaking to their favorite reporters?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think it was largely because of the appoint-
ment of the Warren Commission.
Mr. McKINNEY. I am sorry.
Mr. KATZENBACH. It was largely because of the appointment of the
Warren Commission and their resentment about that. They very much wanted
the report to be made public. They very much wanted to get all the
credit for it. They very much wanted the center stage.
When that was frustrated, I think they took steps of leaking the
information. They have done that in much lesser contexts many, many
times when I was in the Department.
Mr. McKINNEY. Isn't it also possible that there is a definitive
feeling on their part that a leak would not show a deficiency in an
investigation as much as a report would be criticized for deficiencies?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I doubt that. It is a speculation one can make. I
doubt it for only one reason. I doubt very much that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation thought there were any deficiencies whatsoever in their
report.
Mr. McKINNEY. Or as least they thought there would be no deficiencies.
Mr. KATZENBACH. They thought there were none; yes.







649

Mr. McKINNEY. Well, I am fascinated that the Senate came to the
conclusion that, quoting from book V on page 6:
The committee had developed evidence which impeaches the process by
which intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the
assassination and by which they provided information the the Warren
Commission.
They go on to state that "Facts that might have substantially
affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren
Commission." Then you state on page 30 of your deposition that "Mr.
Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to any
agent in the field."
On page 47 of your deposition you said:
You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the
Bureau's acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going
on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very
short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from
the Director himself.
In other words, isn't this really sort of a stone wall attitude
toward the Commission, toward the Attorney General, the Assistant
Attorney General and almost everybody else involved?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, it can be viewed that way. The Bureau, during
the time that I was in the Department of Justice, had a very strong view
that they were to do investigations.
That was their responsibility and their responsibility ran
essentially to Mr. Hoover on that, and they wanted suggestions. They
would follow suggestions, orders with respect to an investigation from
prosecutors, from the attorneys in the Department who had responsibility
for the development of a case.
But essentially how they went about it and how they did it, who was
assigned to it, what they said was received up through their
bureaucracy. What they resented was our talking with an agent in the
field about an investigation he was doing, or about something he was
familiar with rather than get that report coming back through the FBI
bureaucracy and coming out with Mr. Hoover's signature and a memorandum
to the Attorney General from one of the Assistant Directors, as a
memorandum for an Assistant Attorney General or whatever.
That is not all bad. They simply did not want to be pinned with the
views expressed by some agent in the field. If they did not acquiesce in
those views or if they had other information available to them which
cast some doubt upon those views, and I can understand that, as
frustrating as it often was.
I can understand that. I mean, when I was in government or even
today--I have lot of lawyers working for me. Not every one of those
people is expressing my views.
Mr. McKINNEY. I guess one of the bottom lines, then, of all of
this, is to ask the question: If the FBI and if the CIA had been wholly
cooperative and wholly open to the Warren Commission, do you, No. 1,
feel that there would have been any different result in what the Warren
Commission came up with or how long it took to come up with that answer?
Or do you feel that perhaps the Warren Commission's final
conclusions would not have been open to such tremendous criticism and
skepticism?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think obviously things would have been
investigated that were not investigated or investigated in more






650

depth than they were investigated. I have no way at all of knowing
whether what light that would have cast.
I have been personally persuaded that the result was right and I do
not think it would have changed any of the evidence that they had that
led to that result. But I suppose one has to say, an investigation that
did not take place, it is impossible to know what would have come out of it.
And I think on the third part of your question, it is clear to me
that had that been done, had that been investigated, had those facts
been made public, perhaps what is going on here today would not have
taken place, would not have been necessary.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, the opening would not have been
there. It is luck perhaps that the Warren Commission may have hit the
right result but there were so many avenues in which individual
bureaucratic decisions were made not to open and were not discovered
that it is relatively lucky they did not lead anywhere.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think lucky is too strong a word. They did an
awful lot of work and had an awful lot of facts and an awful lot of good
investigation was done in the areas where it was done.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions--one more
question I guess I would ask. In general, we discuss the pressure from
the State Department in the beginning and the reasons for that pressure
and your memorandums.
Do you feel that the pressure from, say, the State Department, the
pressure from the White House, general pressures of the time really made
the Warren Commission do its work too quickly and the FBI do its work
too quickly so that also subjected them to criticism?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think more true of perhaps the initial FBI
report, but I don't think it is possible in that period of time to do
the kind of investigation that had to be done, nor do I think in essence
that was what they were doing. I think they were trying to arrive at a
conclusion on the basis of a very intensive, massive, but hasty
investigation so as to get the most salient facts out.
The Warren Commission, my recollection is, too, about a year, and
it would seem to me that is not--I don't think there was any great
pressure to get it out within a year. If they felt it was 18 months, I
think it would have taken 18 months.
Mr. MCKINNEY. It is known the Chief Justice definitely wanted to
get it out before the heat of a political campaign rose to the front?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, and I am sure he wanted to get back on the bench.
Mr. McKINNEY. It is safe to say you found yourself in the
uncomfortable position of being pressured to get information out but at
the same time realized that speed was certainly not going to make the
FBI investigation as accurate as you would like to see it?
Mr. KATZENBACH. The conclusions might be accurate but the
investigation couldn't conceivably be as thorough in that period of time
as the assassination of a President ought to require.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your answer.
I am finished.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.







651

Mr. PREYER. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
You have served as Attorney General, and a very good one, and you
were also instrumental in setting up the citizens committee.
In the awful chance that we might ever have had to go through this
kind of thing again, would you recommend the setting up of a citizens
committee once again, or would you prefer to rely on the judicial system
solely to investigate such an assassination?
Mr. KATZENBACH. The question is difficult, Congressman, because had
Ruby not shot Oswald, then I think you would have had a very different
state of facts. I assume in those circumstances that it would have been
investigation by the agencies of the Government developing the evidence
they had, for prosecution--at the time by State authorities--of Oswald
for the murder of the President.
Whether subsequent to that, depending on what then happened, you
would have had a commission, a citizens group, such as the Warren
Commission, I suppose, would have depended on what all the surrounding
facts were at that time.
Given the identical situation; yes, if that occurred I would take
the same course again, and I think I would do it the same way. I think I
would rely in the same way and hope that the reliance was not misplaced.
Mr. PREYER. So the fact that there was no public trial possible in
the Kennedy assassination is one good reason for having a citizens
committee?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes sir. You might need one in any event, because a
trial---
Mr. PREYER. Pardon me?
Mr. KATZENBACH. You might need one in any event, because the nature
of a trial might leave out, leave a lot, might e. stablish the guilt of
murder of the defendant without bringing in all of the collateral things
which---
Mr. PREYER. That was going to be my next question, such as the
guilty plea in the James Earl Ray case?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. Of Martin Luther King?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Sure, exactly. Even without the guilty plea the
limits of relevant evidence, there may be a lot of unanswered questions
after the judicial process has been completed.
Mr. PREYER. You mentioned the FBI, you felt, was the most effective
investigative agency in the world, but you have also noted a number of
the difficulties of the citizens committee working with the FBI, certain
institutional jealousies there. Do you think if you had to do it again
that you would advise the Warren Commission to go the route of employing
independent investigators, or would you rely on the FBI as the major
investigative arm?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think the question is somewhat hypothetical
because, you see, I don't think there are other investigators who have
nearly the competence. I don't think they are available in the numbers
that you would need them. So it seemed to me that even today, as then,
not to use the investigative agencies of the Government, and
particularly the FBI, is probably to waste one of the most valuable
assets that you have.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you very much.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired.






652

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katzenbach, nice to have you here with us today.
I suppose that an awful lot of the speculation that grew out of the
Warren Commission, after the completion of its work, over the past 15
years, a lot of it stemmed, and I will ask if you agree or disagree with
this--stemmed from the memorandum, the so-called memorandum from Mr.
Moyers, the November 25 memorandum that you drafted and sent to Bill Moyers.
As I recall, over the past 15 years, on any number of occasions I
have either read or heard people refer to that first paragraph in that
memorandum, three points, and I will quote it for you, then-I don't know
if you have a copy or not, I will see that you get one in front of you.
I am quoting here:
1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that
he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the
evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.

This was November 25, 1963, 3 days after the assassination.
Now, unfortunately they don't always quote the other paragraphs in
that memorandum, which I think to an extent mellow that single
paragraph, but still that paragraph has been quoted extensively as an
indication that the Warren Commission was really a self-fulfilling
prophecy, that it was not designed to investigate the assassination of
the President from a de novo position, but rather to confirm what the
FBI had already concluded, what the Dallas police had concluded, and
that, therefore, the Warren Commission didn't really fulfill its
obligation, the obligation that Chief Justice Warren outlined when he
said our responsibility is to get at the truth.
I am creating that scenario for you because that is how I think it
has been portrayed over the years.
I have listened today to you talk about the various motivations,
and it is hard, one can only sympathize, not empathize, with your
position in those days, what it must have been like to be in the
position you were in and have the responsibilities you had.
Can you tell this committee, or help us try and straighten out what
your motivation was at that moment that you wrote those words--and this
is 3 days after the assassination--"the public must be satisfied that
Oswald was the assassin."
Why was it so important that the public be satisfied that Oswald
was the assassin?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Because, very simply, if that was the conclusion
that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to be satisfied
that that was the correct conclusion
My whole attitude in that memorandum, and I think it is contained
or reflected in other paragraphs that you mentioned, I think it was
reflected in other conversations, other memorandums that you have, one
overwhelming feeling that I had, and that was in the assassination of
the President of the United States, all of the facts, all of the
evidence, everything that was relevant to that had to be made public.
Mr. DODD. You say then, I should quote--in fact, Mr. Chairman, I
would ask unanimous consent that this memorandum, if it is not already
admitted into evidence, be admitted now.






653

Chairman STOKES. I believe it is already in part of the evidence. Mr.
DODD. I think all of it should be there.
You say in the first paragraph:
It is important that all of the facts surrounding President
Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy
people in the United States and abroad all that the facts have been told
and a statement to this effect be made now.
I think that is fine, but still I am perplexed, absolutely
perplexed, on why it was in the public interest to prove that Oswald was
the one, and that as reflected in the next sentence, did not have
confederates who were still at large.
Why was it so important to prove that 3 days after the assassination?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Because for the very simple reason, if that was not
a fact, and all the facts were not on the table, then it seemed to me
that nobody was going to be satisfied, and I thought that the public was
entitled--if there was a conspiracy, then we ought to say there was a
conspiracy. If there were confederates at large, it ought to be said
there were confederates at large.
I knew then already that Oswald had been in Russia, Oswald had been
in Mexico. Now, if you are going to conclude, as the Bureau was
concluding that this was not part of a conspiracy, that there were no
confederates, then you had to make that case, with all of the facts,
absolutely persuasive. If you didn't reveal these facts, somebody else
was going to reveal them.
Now, if there was a conspiracy, there was a conspiracy, and you put
those facts out. But if you were persuaded Oswald was a lone killer, you
had better put all of the facts out and you better not cover up
anything, and you better say now all of the facts are going to be made
public.
That was the advice I was giving Moyers and that was the advice I
was giving the President and that was the motivation for the Warren
Commission.
I don't think this is artistically phrased. Perhaps you have never
written anything that you would like to write better afterwards,
Congressman, but I have.
Mr. DODD. You won't get me to say that.
Mr. KATZENBACH. But I think if you take that, take the other
paragraphs of it, take other things I was quoted as saying, other things
I said, that there is a consistent view on my part.
Mr. DODD. I didn't want to pull this out of context. I want to make
sure it is all in there. In fairness to you, it should all be in there.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I was very conscious of those facts which were
going to be seized upon. Is this a Russian conspiracy? And I was very
conscious, perhaps as a little bit of a history buff, that nobody ever
put to bed satisfactorily the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.
Mr. DODD. You seemed in the next paragraph--I quote you again
here--you say:
Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious
(Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, et cetera). The Dallas police have put out
statements on the Communist conspiracy theory and it was they who were
in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.

Am I off base there in detecting a feeling that you had on November
25, 1963, that there was something more to this, that



654

you felt, in fact, whether intuitively or based on other information,
that this guy had been set up, Oswald was not alone?
I sense that in that paragraph, reading it word for word, and
carefully, that you had some thoughts running through your mind, and you
were expressing them to Bill Moyers in those words.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't think I had a view one way or the other,
other than what I was being told the FBI investigation had, but I was
saying you have got a lot of facts here, if you say Oswald was the lone
killer, he wasn't in conspiracy with anyone, had nothing to do with any
foreign government, you have got a lot of awkward facts that you are
going to have to explain, and you had better explain them satisfactorily
You had better put it all out on the table.
Chairman STOKES. Time has expired
Mr. DODD. May I have 1 more minute and I will terminate?
Chairman STOKES. Without objection.
Mr. DODD. On page 22, when asked by Mr. Cornwell--I won't read the
question to you, but basically he is talking to you about the
assassination plots, asking, during the deposition, about the
assassination plots, and your response is this:

No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to
this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at
the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking
a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat
denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short
conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home
pretty confident.

Did you prepare any memorandum at that time, after that
conversation, or do you remember that conversation so clearly that you
have no doubt in your own mind that Mr. Helms told the President of the
United States in 1965 there were no assassination plots?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember the conversation. It is hard to
remember verbatim word for word. The question may well have been "Have
we ever been involved in any assassination of anybody," and the answer
to that may have been the flat "no."
I don't know, I don't remember exactly how the question was
phrased, but it obviously had to do at that time with Vietnam, and I was
satisfied from that that we didn't engage in that kind of activity in
this country, and I suppose I was satisfied in part, Congressman,
because it was so incredible to me that we should have.
Mr. DODD. You didn't take any notes?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I almost never did. I never had time.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. I just have a single question. Mr. Hart, who was a
spokesman for CIA here in connection with their having taken into
custody for some 3 years Yuri Nosenko, the Russian defector, said that
their authority for putting this man in a specially built isolation cell
for 3 years, was you, that Helms had gone to you and gotten an OK for
this. Is that true?







655

Mr. KATZENBACH. I have no recollection of any conversation
involving Mr. Nosenko with Mr. Helms. There may have been such a
conversation. I don't think that I authorized putting anybody in jail
for 3 years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversation
occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I
don't know.
Mr. SAWYER. But you don't believe that you would have authorized
that kind of thing, if you had been asked?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I think I would have--l think if somebody said
we have a defector, we don't know whether he is a true defector or not,
we have got him under some questioning, I wouldn't have--I don't suppose
that would have bothered me that much. But when you talk about
incarceration for 3 years, and so forth, that seems to me a different
proposition.
One would expect a defector to be questioned by CIA.
Mr. SAWYER. But not put in solitary for 3 years in a specially
constructed vault, in effect?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No. But I would not have been surprised if he
had been questioned intensively for a week or two.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I don't have questions at this time. I
yield my time to the Chair.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I didn't expect Mr. Ford to pass. I don't have my
document out here I wanted to talk to you about.
It has to do with your views as to how, in keeping with your
deposition, you said that we should leave no stone unturned and pursue
every possibility, and so on, and particularly with regard to
conspiracy. There have been some questions here of the Cuban
situation. What I would like to do is ask if you could shed any light as
to how you would have advised the FBI to proceed with the alleged
connections between Jack Ruby and organized crime?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think it should have been explored in
normal investigative ways, that is, they have some sources they were
using and still use, to some extent, electronic devices, in appropriate
circumstances, and I would have thought they would have made any effort,
every effort that was possible, to see what those connections were, if any.
There is certainly a massive amount of data in the FBI with respect
to organized crime. There even was at that time. I suspect there is a
lot more today.
Mr. FITHIAN. I wonder if we might provide the witness with the
February 24 memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Howard Willens. JFK
F-448, I think, is the number. If we could provide that to the witness,
I would ask that it be introduced into the record at this time.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it might be entered into the
record at this time.
[The exhibit follows:]







656

JFK EXHIBIT F-448



















657

JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont.



















658

JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont.



















659

JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont.



















660

JFK EXHIBIT F-448 cont.



















661

Mr. FITHIAN. It is in today's briefing book under exhibit 5. At
least that is its number.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Did you want me to read it?
Mr. FITHIAN. If you would just glance over it quickly.
As I understand your experience in the Department during Attorney
General Kennedy's tenure, you became fairly familiar with the whole
effort on organized crime; is that not correct?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Not really terribly familiar, Congressman. That was
one of the areas that Robert Kennedy was most interested in himself and,
therefore, one of the areas where he had far more extensive knowledge
than I. What I usually picked up from him as deputy was the areas where
he had less interest, so I was not an expert on organized crime.
Mr. FITHIAN. If you would like, just as we chat back and forth
here, to glance over that four or five pages, I think you will find that
there are recommendations here from these two junior attorneys on the
Warren Commission that at least lead me to believe that they were
recommending a much more ambitious program than obviously was pursued
and, in fact, if you go to the page 5 with me, paragraph 9, their
recommendation is really precise, and it said that Mr. Rankin should
address the letter to the chief executive of each of the telephone
companies mentioned in paragraph 8, requesting such companies not
destroy until June 1, 1964, any records that they may have with respect
to telephone services of all subscribers, and so on.
If you look above that it is a number of towns. If you look on the
back in the document there are a number of names that they suggest that
they might pursue, and if you look earlier on in the document you find a
suggestion that they survey any telephone within the reach of Jack Ruby.
Now, I am not really vitally concerned about this document with
this particular witness, Mr. Chairman, but I am interested in what
recommendations you would have made to the Bureau to pursue, or either
you or the Department would have made to the Bureau, to pursue the
possible organized crime complicity in the assassination, and that is
the first part of the question.
The second part is, isn't it reasonable to expect, given the
expertise of Justice in this particular field, that this might be one of
the areas that we as a committee could expect the greatest amount of
interaction between Justice and the Bureau, given your widespread
experience down at Justice in this and the necessity of the two groups
really to cooperate?
Am I way off on that, Mr. Katzenbach?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No. I don't know how you are using the term Justice
on that. I think with respect to the Commission that we felt, in fact,
the Commission should have, whatever investigation the Commission wanted
should be done and should be performed in accordance with what they
wished. I don't recall making any suggestion to the Commission as to
what I thought they should go into.
Mr. Willins was liaison from the Department, using Department in
the narrow sense of the lawyers in the Department. He had considerable
experience with organized crime and I would have expected, because of
the strange shooting of Oswald by Ruby, and





662

because of allegations of organized crime connections--I would have
expected the Commission to go into those to whatever depth they thought
appropriate in terms of coming to whatever conclusions they came to.
My point is I wouldn't have either interfered or wanted them to
interfere or told them what to do.
Mr. FITHIAN. Wouldn't that expectation have been heightened by what
Mr. Rankin told us today that is section No. 4 of their investigative
plan had to do with the whole conspiracy, did anybody at least assist?
Question. I guess what I really want to get to, Mr. Katzenbach, is
in light of the FBI's role as really the investigative arm, granted the
Commission had some lawyers, but the real investigation was done by the
Bureau?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.
Mr. FITHIAN. And the Bureau under the Justice Department. Are you
satisfied---
Mr. KATZENBACH. The Bureau under the Warren Commission, really.
Mr. FITHIAN. All right. Are you satisfied, as you review the case,
that the FBI, in assisting the Warren Commission, did an adequate job
with regard to the approach to investigating the question of any
possible complicity of organized crime via the Jack Ruby link?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't really feel in a position to answer that
question. You gentlemen could answer that question far better than I
because you have gone over all of this to a much greater degree than I have.
Mr. FITHIAN. At any time during the whole Warren Commission
existence, did anyone from either the FBI, to your knowledge, or the
Warren Commission, come over and sit down with the Organized Crime
Section of the Justice Department, or the Attorney General himself, or
anybody, you or anyone else, and sort of review the bidding as to the
approach that they might use in trying to ferret out any possible
association?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I know of no such thing, no such occasion. They
certainly did not with me, but Mr. Willins, who was the liaison there,
he was a very good lawyer, had a lot of experience in organized crime,
and would have been quite competent to have helped to assist them as
they wanted in this respect, and I simply have no knowledge as to what
conversations he had with the Warren Commission or the staff on that
subject, but he was certainly competent to do so.
Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any--
Chairman STOKES. Time has expired.
Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any reports to you?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No. He occasionally told me orally, but it was my
view that the Warren Commission was doing this and our job was to do
what they wanted done, to give them what support they wanted in the job
that they were doing, and not to interfere in any way.
Mr. FITHIAN. And the last question, you never felt that Justice or
the FBI ought to go to the Commission and say, "Look, if you are really
going to look into the organized crime section, this is the way you want
to do it."






663

Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I don't think any occasion came up where I felt
that was appropriate or necessary.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Ohio, Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off
for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked
for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I
understand that Mr. Helms has said that he had a conversation with me,
or recalls that he had a conversation with me on it. I have no
recollection of that conversation. But perhaps his recollection is
better than mine. I don't know. I don't recall any such conversation.
Chairman STOKES. Was this your testimony, that you don't recall
anyone talking to you about it?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, that is my testimony.
Chairman STOKES. At any time?
Mr. KATZENBACH. At any time.
Chairman STOKES. How did you learn of it?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book
called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and
asked me about it. And I said, "Who is Nosenko"?
Chairman STOKES. That would be Mr. Epstein?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was
the first that I heard of it, to my recollection.
Chairman STOKES. So then, so that the record is patently clear on
this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of
this situation?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was
quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko
or anything to do with him during that period of time.
Chairman STOKES. And while you held the office that you held, were
you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector
in this manner?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, sir, the only connections that I can recall
with the CIA at all fell into two categories: One was when they wished
to wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they
came to me; and the only other thing is whenever they wanted a book
suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it.
Chairman STOKES. Told them what?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Told them not to do it, that there wasn't any way
you were going to do it. And those are the only, at least offhand the
only--l had very little connection with the CIA when I--none that I
recall as deputy, a little bit, I guess at the time of the Cuban missile
crisis, and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange. But
I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don't recall, except
for those occasions, their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever,
perhaps for good reason.







664

Chairman STOKES. And you are absolutely certain that you cannot
recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I am certain that I don't recall it; yes, sir. I
can't flatly deny that such a conversation occurred, but I have no
recollection of it. It is quite a while ago, and I believe--I believe if
it was as dramatic as it was put by Congressman Sawyer, I would remember
it. If I was simply informed that somebody was being
questioned, there was a potential defector, I might not recall it.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you. Any other questions?
Mr. SAWYER. Yes.
Mr. Katzenbach, I don't know whether you are informed on the
details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the
CIA, so that it is not just a statement of some employee or something,
he was designated by the present Director to come here and present the
story because he was supposedly the most familiar with it, since he had
reviewed it for the CIA. And he stated in substance that Mr. Nosenko
was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection, or
after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea
and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material, the guards
were instructed neither to talk to him nor smile at him, he was
subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they
built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a
device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around
the bank vault to put this man in, and then kept him there under
equivalent conditions for some 3 years, with that kind of thing, 1,277
days, to be specific.
At which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and
put him on their payroll and let him go. And then they gave, as I
questioned on the authority to do a thing like that, did they have any
kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had
conferred with you and gotten your OK that this would be legal. And I
just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why--and I
also don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked
to OK enough that you wouldn't rather clearly remember the incident, if
it had occurred.
Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts as you have just set them forth to me,
Congressman, had ever been made known to me, (A), I would recollect it,
I am certain; and I hope to goodness I wouldn't have given the legal
advice that it is claimed.
Mr. SAWYER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you. That is
all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does
counsel, Mr. Cornwell, desire to be recognized?
Mr. CORNWELL. I only note, Mr. Chairman, that during the
questioning by the committee members there have been various exhibits
which have been referred to directly or indirectly. They include
exhibits which have been marked for identification as JKF F-462, F-463,
F-465, F-466, F-458, F-471, F-472, F-473, and F-448, and I might ask
they be placed in the record at this time.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the
record at this time.
[The above mentioned JFK exhibits F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466,
F-471, F-472, and F-473, follow:]
[JFK exhibits F-448 and F-458 were entered previously.]






665

JFK EXHIBIT F-462



















666

JFK EXHIBIT F-463




















667

JFK EXHIBIT F-463 cont.



















668

JFK EXHIBIT F-465



















669

JFK EXHIBIT F-465 cont.



















670

JFK EXHIBIT F-466



















671

JFK EXHIBIT F-466 cont.



















672

JFK EXHIBIT F-471



















673

JFK EXHIBIT F-471 cont.



















674

JFK EXHIBIT F-472



















675

JFK EXHIBIT F-472 cont.



















676

JFK EXHIBIT F-472 cont.



















677

JFK EXHIBIT F-473



















678

JFK EXHIBIT F-473 cont.



















679

Mr. CORNWELL. I have nothing further, thank you.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Katzenbach, as a witness before our committee,
you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes
in which to make any comment that you so desire relating to testimony
before this committee, and I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for
that purpose, if you so desire.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I will be very, very brief, Mr. Chairman.
I regret that the Warren Commission report was inadequate, if it
was inadequate in any respects, and that as a consequence this committee
has felt, the Congress has felt through this committee, the necessity to
reexamine the assassination.
I am sure that you, sir, and all the members regret that equally.
I have confidence that what this committee is doing and will do in
its report, will reflect the wisdom and integrity of its members.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, and on behalf of the
committee, we certainly thank you for your appearance here and for the
cooperation you have given this committee and the time you have expended
in giving us the benefit of your testimony. Thank you very much.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. You are excused.
There being nothing further to come before the committee, the
committee adjourns until 9 a.m., tomorrow morning.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene
Friday, September 22, 1978, at 9 a.m.]
[The deposition of Mr. Katzenbach referred to previously follows:]

680

Stenographic Transcript Of

HEARINGS

Before the

President John F. Kennedy

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH


Washington, D.C.

August 4, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Official Reporters

300 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C.



681

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















682

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















683

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.























684

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















685

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















686

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687

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















688

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689

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















690

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















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692

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















693

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















694

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















695

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















696

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















697

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















698

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















699

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















700

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701

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702

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703

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704

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















705

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















706

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















707

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















708

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















709

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















710

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















711

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















712

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















713

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















714

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















715

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















716

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















717

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















718

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















719

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















720

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















721

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















722

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















723

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















724

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















725

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















726

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















727

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















728

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















729

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















730

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















731

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















732

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















733

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















734

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















735

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















736

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















737

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















738

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















739

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















740

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















741

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















742

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















743

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















744

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















745

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















746

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















747

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















748

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH cont.






















749

On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the
following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504

September 25, 1978


The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I
stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms
with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said
there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of
meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms'
recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the
calendar. Although it is clear form this page that there was such a
meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and
therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in
the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt
that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me.
However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I
believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the
District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the
meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the
period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren
Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's
investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry.
While



750

this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not
change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness ot both the
Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esqu.









751

Thursday, April 2, 1964
Harold Reis ) 9:35 a.m. SAW
Sol Lindenbaum ) Civil 9:35 a.m. SAW
Joseph Dolan ) Rights 9:35 a.m. SAW
David Filvaroff ) briefing 9:35 a.m. SAW
John Douglas ) 9:35 a.m. SAW
Jack Rosenthal ) 9:35 a.m. SAW
Burke Marshall ) 9:35 a.m. SAW
David Filvaroff 11:55 a.m. SAW
William Foley 12:27 a.m. SAW
William Orrick 1:50 p.m. SAW
Marshal McShane 2:37 p.m. SAW
David Filvaroff 3:10 p.m. SAW
William Geoghegan 3:25 p.m. SAW
Edgar Chan, O.L.C. 3:30 p.m. SAW
Burke Marshall 3:32 p.m. SAW
Burke Marshall 4:07 p.m. SAW

[Lawrence Houston, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW
[David Murphy, CIA 4:08 p.m. SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley 4:08 p.m. SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div. 4:08 p.m. SAW
[Defector Case] 4:08 p.m. SAW

Addressed Brandeis Univ. 4:40 p.m. SAW
Students (40) in AG's office

Sol Lindenbaum 6:45 p.m. SAW
John Douglas 6:56 p.m. SAW
William Orrick 7:06 p.m. SAW
David Filvaroff 7:12 p.m. SAW
Joseph Dolan 7:15 p.m. SAW

Friday, April 3, 1964
John Duffner (White Motor) 9:15 a.m. SAW
Sol Lindenbaum ) 9:30 a.m. SAW
Harold Reis ) Civil 9:30 a.m. SAW
David Filvaroff ) Rights 9:30 a.m. SAW
Burke Marshall ) briefing 9:30 a.m. SAW
Jack Rosenthal ) 9:30 a.m. SAW
Joseph Dolan ) 9:30 a.m. SAW

NdeBK to Puerto Rico 10:15 a.m.
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
But even if he had written the whole thing earlier, apparently nothing
came to light before he sent it on the 25th that necessitated any changing
of the content.
Post by Robert Harris
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why do conspiracy hobbyists insist on contriving these silly questions?
Name one murder in the history of murder where it can be proven that the
murderer had no help.
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Why do you think you have any aptitude for second guessing actual career
criminal investigators? Please be specific.
Post by Robert Harris
Robert Harris
Bud
2017-08-16 19:31:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Raw Message
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Wasn`t aware I was. Normally I`m being insulting by pointing other
people`s lack of intelligence.
Post by Robert Harris
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Lets see you back that up. A quick search turns up this...
https://www.maryferrell.org/pages/Katzenbach_Memo.html
"He had begun writing it the day earlier, within hours after Oswald's
death at the hands of Jack Ruby."
"begun writing it..."
No, stop misquoting.
Had you been paying attention you would have seen that I quoted the
whole sentence above.
Post by Anthony Marsh
"Had begun." As in much earlier. As in draft.
As in irrelevant. Harris has the whole thing being written about 48
hours after the assassination.
ISSUED.
How does that word apply?
Issued means it was typed up and sent.
How does the word apply to Harris`s claim that the whole letter was
written about 24 hours after the assassination?
Post by Anthony Marsh
It had to be written up as a
draft first. The moment Oswald was dead.
Support that.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Post by Bud
Post by Anthony Marsh
Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill
Oswald.
Support that.
We just quoted him saying that.
Where?
TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Your claim was this...

"Katzenback started working on it the moment he saw RUby kill Oswald."

And in support of your claim you offer Katzenbach saying...

"Mr. KATZENBACH. No. But I would not have been surprised if he had been
questioned intensively for a week or two."
Post by Anthony Marsh
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Katzenbach, it is good to have you with us today. I
ask that you stand and be sworn in at this time. Do you solemnly swear
the evidence you are about to give before this committee will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do.
Mr. PREYER. We have a rather slim attendance at this moment because
of a vote that is on on the House floor. I think Members will be
returning momentarily.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Not a new experience for me.
643
Mr. PREYER. I suggest that we take a several minute recess in
place, if you do not mind. We would like to have--here is Mr. McKinney
here right now. I think we are ready to proceed.
The committee will recognize Gary Cornwell, counsel for the
committee, to begin the questioning of the witness.
Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared at this time to question
the witness. However, I had the opportunity to take a lengthy deposition
from Mr. Katzenbach previously. That deposition has been provided to the
committee and I have been informed that the committee has had an
opportunity to study it carefully.
In light of that, I might suggest, in view of the late hour,
perhaps the committee might simply like to begin first and ask the
questions of Mr. Katzenbach in those areas that we are most concerned with.
Mr. PREYER. Is the deposition a part of the record or do you wish
it introduced into evidence at this point in the record?
Mr. CORNWELL. It is in the files. Mr. Katzenbach has not yet had an
opportunity to read it carefully himself and to sign it. As soon as he
does so, it will be made a permanent part of the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PREYER. Fine. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKinney to begin the
questioning of the witness.
Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Attorney General, it is a pleasure to see you
again. We really appreciate your coming to help us in these
deliberations.
I would like to start out by asking the question as to your
exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the
FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people. This
is somewhat evidenced by your memorandum to Mr. Moyers of November 25.
What was your basic motivation in looking for such speed?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think my basic motivation was the amount of
speculation both here and abroad as to what was going on, whether there
was a conspiracy of the right or a conspiracy of the left or a lone
assassin or even in its wildest stages, a conspiracy by the then Vice
President to achieve the Presidency, the sort of thing you have
speculation about in some countries abroad where that kind of condition
is normal.
It seemed to me that the quicker some information could be made
available that went beyond what the press was able to uncover and what
the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state of
affairs.
Mr. McKINNEY. In your deposition to the committee on page 8, you
suggested that one of your interests was that the facts, all of them,
had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the
public, both in this country and abroad, the confidence that no facts
were being withheld at all.
Do you think that pushing for this type of speed might have hurt
the accuracy of the report or brought about the fact that some people
would question the speed of its issuance its thoroughness its
completeness?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not think the two notions are connected,
Congressman. I think the motivations for getting some kind of report
out, some facts out early were the ones that I have stated.
644
The memorandum of Mr. Moyers and a number of other conversations and
things that I have said really related to the desirability of a totally
thorough, complete investigation by a commission, such as the Warren
Commission, which should point out all of the facts available and all of
the reasons for their conclusions.
I never intended at any point that the investigation done by the
FBI would be a substitute for the kind of investigation of President
Kennedy's assassination.
Mr. McKINNEY. Perhaps for the general public and for the committee,
you could discuss for us your recollection of when and how the idea of a
Presidential Commission came forth. I know you mention it in your
memorandum to Mr. Moyers again.
How did you feel about it, at first? Were you opposed to it or not,
and when it was finally firmed up, how was it finally decided?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think an idea like that perhaps has several
apparents. It was something that very soon after the assassination I
thought was a good idea, that such a Commission should be formed of
people of impeccable integrity, people who would search for the truth
and who would make that truth public because I did not believe that if
it remained entirely within the executive branch that that effect could
ever be achieved as far as the general public here or abroad was concerned.
So, I thought very early that such a Commission was essential to,
really to the political process, to getting all of the facts out on such
an occasion as the assassination of a popular and respected President.
So, I pressed for that very early. I was never opposed to it. I
was, however, in a somewhat awkward position because of my
responsibilities in the Department of Justice as Deputy Attorney General
at that time and, in effect, very nearly acting Attorney General at that
time because of Robert Kennedy's tragic loss and reaction that he had to
the assassination of his brother.
My awkwardness was because it was perfectly obvious to anybody who
knew anything about the Federal Bureau of Investigation that they were
certain to resent the appointment of any such commission. 80, on the one
hand, and if I were thought to be the source of that or to recommend
that, then it would very seriously affect my relations with Mr. Hoover
and the Bureau.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, it is safe to say that with the mere
mention of another investigation or another investigation or an
investigative commission, Mr. Hoover would have considered it a somewhat
of an insult to the FBI in its activities in this area.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Absolutely.
Mr. McKINNEY. You brought up the subject of the Attorney General,
so I will move to that for just a moment. I think it also might be of
benefit to the committee and the public if you were to describe to us as
best you could the Attorney General's role and his feelings at that
time. It has been difficult, I think, even though everyone is aware of
the tremendous loss, for many people to understand why the Attorney
General., who had had task forces all over the United States looking
into organized crime, who had been an active prosecutor of organized
crime, who had been an extremely activist Attorney General, why he never
took more of a role in ordering the FBI to do things and in ordering his
in-the-field people
645
who had connections with the Mafia to move into any areas such as the
Cuban area.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, when the assassination occurred, Robert
Kennedy's world just came apart, in that not only his affection for his
brother, but everything that they had been trying to do, everything they
had worked for a long time just went with that shot.
He was very devastated both I think by the personal loss and by the
sudden crashing halt of all of the things that he had worked for with
his brother for a long period of time.
His attitude was not difficult, I think, for those who knew him
well to understand. He said nothing that was done was going to bring his
brother back to life and it was, I think, almost as simple as that, as
far as he was concerned.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, not only was his devastation personal
but it was political in that it was just over, the whole dream.
Mr. KATZENBACH, I think it was both. Both the two were so
intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish them, I think. I think I
would put them both under the feeling of personal. Everything that you
were doing in life, a brother who was beloved just suddenly turned to
dust.
Mr. McKINNEY. Throughout your deposition, you bring up a point that
I do not think as a committee member I was aware of. Even in discussing
the formation of a commission on page 13 of your deposition, you said,
"I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility abroad
than any other American."
And you go on throughout your deposition in describing a tremendous
amount of pressure from the State Department. I wonder if you would like
to go into that in any more depth for the committee as to exactly why
that pressure and in what forms it took. We have several exhibits
suggesting the international repercussions, which I will put in the
record later, which are essentially memos from Belmont, Jenkins, and
Donahou and others.
I thought perhaps you might like to go into the background of
that.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I was certainly communicated with several
times by the State Department and I suppose in a sense that is
pressure, although I do not know that I really felt it as pressure. I
felt they had their problems and they wanted some help in trying
to resolve them.
We have 120, or whatever it is, Embassies around the world and
every Ambassador there was being asked about this, being asked
by that government what was happening, what was the story on it,
as well as what effect it would have on our foreign policy, and 1
think they were very--being no information really available to
them, they were simply feeling the lack of it and feeling that
affected their credibility in foreign governments.
Mr. McKINNEY. Were they suggesting or did you have any con-
versations with the White House that suggested that perhaps
President Johnson's viability as a world leader was in question or
weakened until the whole issue of who shot President Kennedy was
resolved to the world's satisfaction?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I do not now recall any conversations as specif-
ic as that. It seems to me that had to be an underlying factor and,
646
in addition, perhaps it is important to remember that President Kennedy
had worked a long time and had achieved a considerable amount of stature
after some fairly difficult beginnings.
That here was not a totally unknown President, not totally unknown,
relatively certainly unknown person in the Presidency.
Mr. MCKINNEY. As essentially, although certainly not officially,
acting Attorney General during this period would you describe to the
committee what your relationship was with Mr. Hoover at that time?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I had never had a great deal of relationship with
Mr. Hoover in terms of personal relationship with him. I suppose I had
seen him a half dozen times maybe while I was in the Department of
Justice. He had a considerable animosity, I think, toward Robert Kennedy.
I think he had never been in a position of having an Attorney
General who was closer to the President than he was and that was a new
situation for him, and one I do not think he liked. His relationship
with Mr. Kennedy was very, I think, cold formal and I suppose as Robert
Kennedy's deputy, some of that shed off on me.
Mr. McKINNEY. Wasn't it true or isn't it inferable that Bobby
Kennedy's very drive against organized crime was, in effect, a slap in
the face to Mr. Hoover in that it implied that the FBI had not been the
gangbusters that we were all brought up to think they were?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I think that is true and, of course, the drive
in civil rights was one that kept exposing the Bureau to criticism,
right or wrong, and that was resented by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover resented
criticism to a degree greater than any other person that I have ever known.
Mr. McKINNEY. I do not know whether you were in the room earlier,
but I mentioned and brought up to Mr. Rankin a letter to Mr. Tolson in
which the FBI, in essence, refused to go to the Warren Commission
meeting as liaison and in essence refused to brief you as to what they
were doing, stating that they would have nothing further to say to
either the Commission or anyone else until their investigation was finished.
This was somewhat a slap to you as well as to the Warren
Commission. How did you react to this?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think, Congressman, the first thing to remember
is that was a letter from Allen Belmont to Tolson, not a piece of paper
that I saw at the time or the Chief Justice saw at the time or that
anybody other than those within the Bureau.
I think it is also important to remember that no memorandum, no
letter written in the Bureau was really written for anyone other than
Mr. Hoover. That is, it would reflect whatever the author thought Mr.
Hoover's views were. I do not believe that Al Belmont put to me or had
me put to the Chief Justice any flat refusal of that kind to go as a
liaison.
My recollection is that the Bureau's attitude at that time was that
it would be better if we did not go to this organizational meeting of
the Commission because we will be asked a lot of questions about a
report that is not complete, which we do not wish to answer until the
report is complete; not an unreasonable posi-
647
tion to take and not one which reflects the attitudes reflected in the
memorandum which you are reading.
And I believe that 1 probably, although I have no specific
recollection of it, conveyed to the Chief Justice that view and those
reasons and that he accepted them.
Mr. McKINNEY. How did you feel as the Warren Commission moved on in
its work? How did you feel about the FBI's thoroughness and the FBI's
cooperation with the Commission?
Mr. KATZENBACH. It was always my view, the whole time that I was in
the Department of Justice, that the Bureau would do what you asked the
Bureau to do and that they would do it well and professionally. They did
not like what they were doing. They might want something more specific
in the way of instructions than if they liked what they were doing.
For example, if you were to look at the files now on civil rights
matters and compared them with ordinary crimes that the Bureau was
investigating, you would find very detailed memorandum to the FBI from
John Door in the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall saying please do
this and then answers to that or this, do something else, three and four
page instructions.
Whereas if it was a kidnapping, you did not really have to give
them any instructions. They were there and doing things as they ought to
be done.
I regarded then and I regard now, despite all that has come out,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation is probably the most highly trained,
the most effective investigative agency in the world.
Mr. MCKINNEY. How do you tie that though to the fact that we now
know they actually withheld from the Warren Commission any information
they had regarding the CIA's overtures to the Mafia and the
assassination attempts against Castro?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I am very surprised that they did that and I really
have no explanation as to why they did that. It may have been because
Mr. Dulles was a member of the Commission and they thought that was his
job to do it, but I am quite surprised, given relationships between the
FBI and the CIA, I am surprised that the FBI did not seize the
opportunity to embarrass the CIA.
Mr. MCKINNEY. I am glad you used that word "embarrass" the CIA
because I was going to ask you if you would describe your understanding
at this period. My understanding is that the Director of the FBI had
removed liaison from the CIA and the CIA retaliated. We had a situation
where neither agency was talking to the other, basically on the basis of
personal animosity rather than anything factual.
Is this your understanding of their relationship at this time?
Mr. KATZENBACH. There may be some overstatement in that.
Essentially that was strained for that reason. On the other hand,
whenever that occurred and it occurred on other occasions, liaison was
maintained simply because it had to be maintained at a lower level.
Mr. McKINNEY. You state in your deposition--we will move on to the
Perhaps naively, but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles
to the Commission would insure that the Commission had access to
anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles
did not at least make that
648
information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been
skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be
further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of
secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978.
And then you went on to say that you are referring to generally
anything that the CIA had in its files. Are you somewhat appalled at
this point when you find out that not only were the files not thoroughly
given to the Warren Commission but that such impor-
tant things as Nosenko were not really given very happily?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I am.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think that there is anything that this
committee could possibly propose, should this terrible type of horror
happen again, that would give a Commission such as the Warren Commission
any type of authority which would override the bureaucratic malaise that
we seemed to have had back during the Warren Commission days?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I really cannot think of anything offhand. In the
final analysis in government, you have to rely on the integrity and the
competence of people in high position. They may not always have the
integrity they should have and they may not always have that competence,
but if you do not have that, it is pretty hard to scotch tape a solution
around.
Mr. MCKINNEY. There are two letters, as you probably know, which
are Kennedy exhibits F-466 and F-473 from Mr. DeLoach, one of them on
11-25 and one on 12-20 concerning the leaks of the FBI information and a
report, in essence, in one accusing you of leaking information. In your
deposition you indicated it would be difficult for you to do so because
you did not know the information.
And I just wondered what you could give this committee that would
enlighten us at to why the FBI instead of simply putting out their
report with the facts as they saw them started this process of slowly
leaking to their favorite reporters?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think it was largely because of the appoint-
ment of the Warren Commission.
Mr. McKINNEY. I am sorry.
Mr. KATZENBACH. It was largely because of the appointment of the
Warren Commission and their resentment about that. They very much wanted
the report to be made public. They very much wanted to get all the
credit for it. They very much wanted the center stage.
When that was frustrated, I think they took steps of leaking the
information. They have done that in much lesser contexts many, many
times when I was in the Department.
Mr. McKINNEY. Isn't it also possible that there is a definitive
feeling on their part that a leak would not show a deficiency in an
investigation as much as a report would be criticized for deficiencies?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I doubt that. It is a speculation one can make. I
doubt it for only one reason. I doubt very much that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation thought there were any deficiencies whatsoever in their
report.
Mr. McKINNEY. Or as least they thought there would be no deficiencies.
Mr. KATZENBACH. They thought there were none; yes.
649
Mr. McKINNEY. Well, I am fascinated that the Senate came to the
The committee had developed evidence which impeaches the process by
which intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the
assassination and by which they provided information the the Warren
Commission.
They go on to state that "Facts that might have substantially
affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren
Commission." Then you state on page 30 of your deposition that "Mr.
Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to any
agent in the field."
You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the
Bureau's acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going
on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very
short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from
the Director himself.
In other words, isn't this really sort of a stone wall attitude
toward the Commission, toward the Attorney General, the Assistant
Attorney General and almost everybody else involved?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, it can be viewed that way. The Bureau, during
the time that I was in the Department of Justice, had a very strong view
that they were to do investigations.
That was their responsibility and their responsibility ran
essentially to Mr. Hoover on that, and they wanted suggestions. They
would follow suggestions, orders with respect to an investigation from
prosecutors, from the attorneys in the Department who had responsibility
for the development of a case.
But essentially how they went about it and how they did it, who was
assigned to it, what they said was received up through their
bureaucracy. What they resented was our talking with an agent in the
field about an investigation he was doing, or about something he was
familiar with rather than get that report coming back through the FBI
bureaucracy and coming out with Mr. Hoover's signature and a memorandum
to the Attorney General from one of the Assistant Directors, as a
memorandum for an Assistant Attorney General or whatever.
That is not all bad. They simply did not want to be pinned with the
views expressed by some agent in the field. If they did not acquiesce in
those views or if they had other information available to them which
cast some doubt upon those views, and I can understand that, as
frustrating as it often was.
I can understand that. I mean, when I was in government or even
today--I have lot of lawyers working for me. Not every one of those
people is expressing my views.
Mr. McKINNEY. I guess one of the bottom lines, then, of all of
this, is to ask the question: If the FBI and if the CIA had been wholly
cooperative and wholly open to the Warren Commission, do you, No. 1,
feel that there would have been any different result in what the Warren
Commission came up with or how long it took to come up with that answer?
Or do you feel that perhaps the Warren Commission's final
conclusions would not have been open to such tremendous criticism and
skepticism?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think obviously things would have been
investigated that were not investigated or investigated in more
650
depth than they were investigated. I have no way at all of knowing
whether what light that would have cast.
I have been personally persuaded that the result was right and I do
not think it would have changed any of the evidence that they had that
led to that result. But I suppose one has to say, an investigation that
did not take place, it is impossible to know what would have come out of it.
And I think on the third part of your question, it is clear to me
that had that been done, had that been investigated, had those facts
been made public, perhaps what is going on here today would not have
taken place, would not have been necessary.
Mr. McKINNEY. In other words, the opening would not have been
there. It is luck perhaps that the Warren Commission may have hit the
right result but there were so many avenues in which individual
bureaucratic decisions were made not to open and were not discovered
that it is relatively lucky they did not lead anywhere.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think lucky is too strong a word. They did an
awful lot of work and had an awful lot of facts and an awful lot of good
investigation was done in the areas where it was done.
Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions--one more
question I guess I would ask. In general, we discuss the pressure from
the State Department in the beginning and the reasons for that pressure
and your memorandums.
Do you feel that the pressure from, say, the State Department, the
pressure from the White House, general pressures of the time really made
the Warren Commission do its work too quickly and the FBI do its work
too quickly so that also subjected them to criticism?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think more true of perhaps the initial FBI
report, but I don't think it is possible in that period of time to do
the kind of investigation that had to be done, nor do I think in essence
that was what they were doing. I think they were trying to arrive at a
conclusion on the basis of a very intensive, massive, but hasty
investigation so as to get the most salient facts out.
The Warren Commission, my recollection is, too, about a year, and
it would seem to me that is not--I don't think there was any great
pressure to get it out within a year. If they felt it was 18 months, I
think it would have taken 18 months.
Mr. MCKINNEY. It is known the Chief Justice definitely wanted to
get it out before the heat of a political campaign rose to the front?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, and I am sure he wanted to get back on the bench.
Mr. McKINNEY. It is safe to say you found yourself in the
uncomfortable position of being pressured to get information out but at
the same time realized that speed was certainly not going to make the
FBI investigation as accurate as you would like to see it?
Mr. KATZENBACH. The conclusions might be accurate but the
investigation couldn't conceivably be as thorough in that period of time
as the assassination of a President ought to require.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your answer.
I am finished.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
651
Mr. PREYER. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
You have served as Attorney General, and a very good one, and you
were also instrumental in setting up the citizens committee.
In the awful chance that we might ever have had to go through this
kind of thing again, would you recommend the setting up of a citizens
committee once again, or would you prefer to rely on the judicial system
solely to investigate such an assassination?
Mr. KATZENBACH. The question is difficult, Congressman, because had
Ruby not shot Oswald, then I think you would have had a very different
state of facts. I assume in those circumstances that it would have been
investigation by the agencies of the Government developing the evidence
they had, for prosecution--at the time by State authorities--of Oswald
for the murder of the President.
Whether subsequent to that, depending on what then happened, you
would have had a commission, a citizens group, such as the Warren
Commission, I suppose, would have depended on what all the surrounding
facts were at that time.
Given the identical situation; yes, if that occurred I would take
the same course again, and I think I would do it the same way. I think I
would rely in the same way and hope that the reliance was not misplaced.
Mr. PREYER. So the fact that there was no public trial possible in
the Kennedy assassination is one good reason for having a citizens
committee?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes sir. You might need one in any event, because a
trial---
Mr. PREYER. Pardon me?
Mr. KATZENBACH. You might need one in any event, because the nature
of a trial might leave out, leave a lot, might e. stablish the guilt of
murder of the defendant without bringing in all of the collateral things
which---
Mr. PREYER. That was going to be my next question, such as the
guilty plea in the James Earl Ray case?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. Of Martin Luther King?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Sure, exactly. Even without the guilty plea the
limits of relevant evidence, there may be a lot of unanswered questions
after the judicial process has been completed.
Mr. PREYER. You mentioned the FBI, you felt, was the most effective
investigative agency in the world, but you have also noted a number of
the difficulties of the citizens committee working with the FBI, certain
institutional jealousies there. Do you think if you had to do it again
that you would advise the Warren Commission to go the route of employing
independent investigators, or would you rely on the FBI as the major
investigative arm?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I think the question is somewhat hypothetical
because, you see, I don't think there are other investigators who have
nearly the competence. I don't think they are available in the numbers
that you would need them. So it seemed to me that even today, as then,
not to use the investigative agencies of the Government, and
particularly the FBI, is probably to waste one of the most valuable
assets that you have.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you very much.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired.
652
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katzenbach, nice to have you here with us today.
I suppose that an awful lot of the speculation that grew out of the
Warren Commission, after the completion of its work, over the past 15
years, a lot of it stemmed, and I will ask if you agree or disagree with
this--stemmed from the memorandum, the so-called memorandum from Mr.
Moyers, the November 25 memorandum that you drafted and sent to Bill Moyers.
As I recall, over the past 15 years, on any number of occasions I
have either read or heard people refer to that first paragraph in that
memorandum, three points, and I will quote it for you, then-I don't know
if you have a copy or not, I will see that you get one in front of you.
1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that
he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the
evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.
This was November 25, 1963, 3 days after the assassination.
Now, unfortunately they don't always quote the other paragraphs in
that memorandum, which I think to an extent mellow that single
paragraph, but still that paragraph has been quoted extensively as an
indication that the Warren Commission was really a self-fulfilling
prophecy, that it was not designed to investigate the assassination of
the President from a de novo position, but rather to confirm what the
FBI had already concluded, what the Dallas police had concluded, and
that, therefore, the Warren Commission didn't really fulfill its
obligation, the obligation that Chief Justice Warren outlined when he
said our responsibility is to get at the truth.
I am creating that scenario for you because that is how I think it
has been portrayed over the years.
I have listened today to you talk about the various motivations,
and it is hard, one can only sympathize, not empathize, with your
position in those days, what it must have been like to be in the
position you were in and have the responsibilities you had.
Can you tell this committee, or help us try and straighten out what
your motivation was at that moment that you wrote those words--and this
is 3 days after the assassination--"the public must be satisfied that
Oswald was the assassin."
Why was it so important that the public be satisfied that Oswald
was the assassin?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Because, very simply, if that was the conclusion
that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to be satisfied
that that was the correct conclusion
My whole attitude in that memorandum, and I think it is contained
or reflected in other paragraphs that you mentioned, I think it was
reflected in other conversations, other memorandums that you have, one
overwhelming feeling that I had, and that was in the assassination of
the President of the United States, all of the facts, all of the
evidence, everything that was relevant to that had to be made public.
Mr. DODD. You say then, I should quote--in fact, Mr. Chairman, I
would ask unanimous consent that this memorandum, if it is not already
admitted into evidence, be admitted now.
653
Chairman STOKES. I believe it is already in part of the evidence. Mr.
DODD. I think all of it should be there.
It is important that all of the facts surrounding President
Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy
people in the United States and abroad all that the facts have been told
and a statement to this effect be made now.
I think that is fine, but still I am perplexed, absolutely
perplexed, on why it was in the public interest to prove that Oswald was
the one, and that as reflected in the next sentence, did not have
confederates who were still at large.
Why was it so important to prove that 3 days after the assassination?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Because for the very simple reason, if that was not
a fact, and all the facts were not on the table, then it seemed to me
that nobody was going to be satisfied, and I thought that the public was
entitled--if there was a conspiracy, then we ought to say there was a
conspiracy. If there were confederates at large, it ought to be said
there were confederates at large.
I knew then already that Oswald had been in Russia, Oswald had been
in Mexico. Now, if you are going to conclude, as the Bureau was
concluding that this was not part of a conspiracy, that there were no
confederates, then you had to make that case, with all of the facts,
absolutely persuasive. If you didn't reveal these facts, somebody else
was going to reveal them.
Now, if there was a conspiracy, there was a conspiracy, and you put
those facts out. But if you were persuaded Oswald was a lone killer, you
had better put all of the facts out and you better not cover up
anything, and you better say now all of the facts are going to be made
public.
That was the advice I was giving Moyers and that was the advice I
was giving the President and that was the motivation for the Warren
Commission.
I don't think this is artistically phrased. Perhaps you have never
written anything that you would like to write better afterwards,
Congressman, but I have.
Mr. DODD. You won't get me to say that.
Mr. KATZENBACH. But I think if you take that, take the other
paragraphs of it, take other things I was quoted as saying, other things
I said, that there is a consistent view on my part.
Mr. DODD. I didn't want to pull this out of context. I want to make
sure it is all in there. In fairness to you, it should all be in there.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I was very conscious of those facts which were
going to be seized upon. Is this a Russian conspiracy? And I was very
conscious, perhaps as a little bit of a history buff, that nobody ever
put to bed satisfactorily the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.
Mr. DODD. You seemed in the next paragraph--I quote you again
Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious
(Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, et cetera). The Dallas police have put out
statements on the Communist conspiracy theory and it was they who were
in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.
Am I off base there in detecting a feeling that you had on November
25, 1963, that there was something more to this, that
654
you felt, in fact, whether intuitively or based on other information,
that this guy had been set up, Oswald was not alone?
I sense that in that paragraph, reading it word for word, and
carefully, that you had some thoughts running through your mind, and you
were expressing them to Bill Moyers in those words.
Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't think I had a view one way or the other,
other than what I was being told the FBI investigation had, but I was
saying you have got a lot of facts here, if you say Oswald was the lone
killer, he wasn't in conspiracy with anyone, had nothing to do with any
foreign government, you have got a lot of awkward facts that you are
going to have to explain, and you had better explain them satisfactorily
You had better put it all out on the table.
Chairman STOKES. Time has expired
Mr. DODD. May I have 1 more minute and I will terminate?
Chairman STOKES. Without objection.
Mr. DODD. On page 22, when asked by Mr. Cornwell--I won't read the
question to you, but basically he is talking to you about the
assassination plots, asking, during the deposition, about the
No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to
this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at
the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking
a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat
denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short
conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home
pretty confident.
Did you prepare any memorandum at that time, after that
conversation, or do you remember that conversation so clearly that you
have no doubt in your own mind that Mr. Helms told the President of the
United States in 1965 there were no assassination plots?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember the conversation. It is hard to
remember verbatim word for word. The question may well have been "Have
we ever been involved in any assassination of anybody," and the answer
to that may have been the flat "no."
I don't know, I don't remember exactly how the question was
phrased, but it obviously had to do at that time with Vietnam, and I was
satisfied from that that we didn't engage in that kind of activity in
this country, and I suppose I was satisfied in part, Congressman,
because it was so incredible to me that we should have.
Mr. DODD. You didn't take any notes?
Mr. KATZENBACH. I almost never did. I never had time.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. I just have a single question. Mr. Hart, who was a
spokesman for CIA here in connection with their having taken into
custody for some 3 years Yuri Nosenko, the Russian defector, said that
their authority for putting this man in a specially built isolation cell
for 3 years, was you, that Helms had gone to you and gotten an OK for
this. Is that true?
655
Mr. KATZENBACH. I have no recollection of any conversation
involving Mr. Nosenko with Mr. Helms. There may have been such a
conversation. I don't think that I authorized putting anybody in jail
for 3 years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversation
occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I
don't know.
Mr. SAWYER. But you don't believe that you would have authorized
that kind of thing, if you had been asked?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No, I think I would have--l think if somebody said
we have a defector, we don't know whether he is a true defector or not,
we have got him under some questioning, I wouldn't have--I don't suppose
that would have bothered me that much. But when you talk about
incarceration for 3 years, and so forth, that seems to me a different
proposition.
One would expect a defector to be questioned by CIA.
Mr. SAWYER. But not put in solitary for 3 years in a specially
constructed vault, in effect?
Mr. KATZENBACH. No. But I would not have been surprised if he
had been questioned intensively for a week or two.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I don't have questions at this time. I
yield my time to the Chair.
Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman
from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I didn't expect Mr. Ford to pass. I don't have my
document out here I wanted to talk to you about.
It has to do with your views as to how, in keeping with your
deposition, you said that we should leave no stone unturned and pursue
every possibility, and so on, and particularly with regard to
conspiracy. There have been some questions here of the Cuban
situation. What I would like to do is ask if you could shed any light as
to how you would have advised the FBI to proceed with the alleged
connections between Jack Ruby and organized crime?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Well, I think it should have been explored in
normal investigative ways, that is, they have some sources they were
using and still use, to some extent, electronic devices, in appropriate
circumstances, and I would have thought they would have made any effort,
every effort that was possible, to see what those connections were, if any.
There is certainly a massive amount of data ...
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-10 12:46:26 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
Post by Bud
Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Investigation. Katzenbach sent that memo out 11/25, at which time there
was probably 10,000 man hours of investigation.
Stop insulting everyone's intelligence, Bud.
Katzenbach wrote the thing on Sunday the 24th, about 48 hours after the
assassination.
Why don't you just present the evidence they found, which proved Oswald
acted alone?
Why don't you just present the evidence they found which proved it was a
conspiracy?
I did:

http://www.the-puzzle-palace.com/cubahoax.htm
Post by Robert Harris
Please be specific.
Robert Harris
Anthony Marsh
2017-08-09 11:59:10 UTC
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How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald had no
accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
That's not what it says. It says they they have to tell the public that
lie.
Did they base it on almost half of the witnesses saying they heard a
shot from the Knoll?
Whimpy. Real WC defenders can claim that a shot from the grassy knoll does
not ipso facto prove conspiracy. They say that it could be coincidence,
just a second lone nut. Or acoustic ducting. Or echoes. Or auditory
hallucination.
Did they base it on most of the witnesses stating that the final shots
were very close together, some saying almost "simultaneous"?
Never rely on witnesses.
The spacing of the shots does not affect the desire to blame it on a
lone nut.
Did they base it on the DPD's conclusion, just hours earlier, that
Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy?
Yes.
Did they base it on Hoover's belief that Connally came between a sniper
and JFK, as he reported to LBJ?
No.
Has it ever occurred to you that they had about as much evidence as you
do, to support the lone nut theory, and that you have NONE :-)
Much less.
Robert Harris
c***@gmail.com
2017-08-09 20:02:41 UTC
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Post by Anthony Marsh
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald had no
accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
That's not what it says. It says they they have to tell the public that
lie.
Did they base it on almost half of the witnesses saying they heard a
shot from the Knoll?
Whimpy. Real WC defenders can claim that a shot from the grassy knoll does
not ipso facto prove conspiracy. They say that it could be coincidence,
just a second lone nut. Or acoustic ducting. Or echoes. Or auditory
hallucination.
Real WC defenders claim there was no shot from the grassy knoll. That's
your "magic" bullet, not ours.
Post by Anthony Marsh
Did they base it on most of the witnesses stating that the final shots
were very close together, some saying almost "simultaneous"?
Never rely on witnesses.
The spacing of the shots does not affect the desire to blame it on a
lone nut.
Did they base it on the DPD's conclusion, just hours earlier, that
Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy?
Yes.
Did they base it on Hoover's belief that Connally came between a sniper
and JFK, as he reported to LBJ?
No.
Has it ever occurred to you that they had about as much evidence as you
do, to support the lone nut theory, and that you have NONE :-)
Much less.
Robert Harris
Real WC defenders claim there was no shot from the grassy knoll. That's
your "magic" bullet, not ours.
c***@gmail.com
2017-08-09 20:02:15 UTC
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Post by Robert Harris
How exactly, did Katzenbach and Hoover confirm that Oswald
had no accomplices within 48 hours of the assassination?
Did they base it on almost half of the witnesses saying they
heard a shot from the Knoll?
Did they base it on most of the witnesses stating that the
final shots were very close together, some saying almost
"simultaneous"?
Did they base it on the DPD's conclusion, just hours earlier,
that Oswald was part of a communist conspiracy?
Did they base it on Hoover's belief that Connally came
between a sniper and JFK, as he reported to LBJ?
Has it ever occurred to you that they had about as much
evidence as you do, to support the lone nut theory, and that
you have NONE :-)
Robert Harris
Could there be a more innocent explanation for the wording in the famous
Katzenbach memo? Fortunately, Katzenbach was around for many, many years.
In .fact, he just passed away a few years ago. Here's what he said about
the memo in a January 23, 2008 interview:


Interviewer: Three days after President Kennedy’s death, you wrote
a memo to Bill Moyers, who was working in the White House, urging the
creation of what became the Warren Commission. That memo has proved to be
catnip to conspiracy theorists, since it appears to argue for speed over
thoroughness.

Katzenbach: "Badly written memo. It seems to me that the answer to those
who think it was a whitewash is: How on earth could you appoint a
commission like that and then shut them up? But there was so much
potential for conspiracy around: Oswald’s visit to Russia, his
Russian wife. ... And if you look back on Abe Lincoln’s
assassination, right up to this day you have people talking about a
conspiracy there. It’s not very satisfactory to have some nut
shoot the president without having a conspiracy. My purpose was to try to
gather all the evidence and get it out and tell people it’s going
to be out. That was what I wrote that memo to try to say, and I
didn’t say it very well."

Of course in the world of the JFK Buff, there are no poorly worded memos,
no coincidences, no actions that speak to incompetence when malice can be
substituted. This memo has been a nothing-burger forever, yet Buffs can't
let it go.
David Von Pein
2017-08-10 02:31:19 UTC
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My $0.02 re: "The Katzenbach Memo"....

http://jfk-archives.blogspot.com/2015/07/jfk-assassination-arguments-part-971.html
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